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Abstract: 
This article describes the benefits and pitfalls of starting a firm with an entrepreneurial team, 
drawing on a longitudinal empirical analysis of the life course of 90 team start-ups and 1196 
solo start-ups in the Netherlands. In the first three years of their existence, team start-ups 
perform better than solo start-ups on several success indicators. However, after this start 
phase, entrepreneurial teams face particular problems in realizing further growth. These 
team-specific bottlenecks can even threaten firm survival. In later life course phases we found 
a clear distinction between entrepreneurial teams with stagnating growth and teams that 
succeeded in solving these problems and went on to realize further growth. 
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Introduction 
 
Entrepreneurship is seen as a crucial determinant of economic development. Entrepreneurs 
recognize and capitalize on opportunities so that a business organization can be created and 
evolve. The centrality of entrepreneurship in the current economy, or even society, is 
expressed in scientific and policy discourses as the entrepreneurial economy (Audretsch & 
Thurik, 2000) and the entrepreneurial society (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 1999). In 
contrast with the traditional, everyday depiction of the entrepreneur as a ‘lonely hero’, 
research has shown that entrepreneurship is a collective activity (Schoonhoven & Romanelli, 
2001) and that teams of entrepreneurs are critical for the growth of new ventures (Birley & 
Stockley, 2000; Kamm et al., 1990; Weinzimmer, 1997). Empirical studies have 
demonstrated that starting with a team has a strong positive effect on growth with respect to 
both turnover and employment (Lechler, 2001). Team start-ups are intensively discussed in 
the field of entrepreneurship research, although to date there has been no explicit object of 
comparative research (Mellewigt & Späth, 2001). Since most former studies have focused on 
the performance of merely surviving entrepreneurial teams in a retrospective view, we still do 
not know how team start-ups intrinsically differ from ‘regular’ solo start-ups during the life 
course. In this paper we report our empirical exploration of: (1) the characteristics of team 
start-ups in comparison with those of start-ups in general; (2) the differences in performance; 
(3) bottlenecks encountered in team start-ups in comparison with solo start-ups. We have 
defined team start-ups as new enterprises started by at least two persons, in joint ownership, 
with both actively participating in the strategy or management of the enterprise.  
We commence with a literature review on the performance and development of start-ups in 
general and team start-ups in particular. We then describe the cohort of start-ups on which 
our empirical research is based. Next, the outcomes of our empirical research are discussed. 
The paper finishes with our conclusions and recommendations for practitioners and for 
further research.  
 
 
Performance and development of start-ups  
 
In the last few decades there has been considerable research on the performance of start-ups 
in general. Many empirical studies have been published (see Barkham et al., 1996; Schutjens 
& Wever, 2000; Storey, 1997; Wiklund, 1998). These studies have shown some recurrent 
determinants of firm growth when this is measured in terms of number of employees. Storey 
(1997) has identified three main groups of factors that influence the growth of the small firm: 
the background/resources of the entrepreneur(s); the nature of the firm itself; and the strategic 
decisions taken by the owner-managers in the firm. Only when these three components are 
appropriately combined can growth be achieved. Important elements related to the 
background/resources of the entrepreneur are motivation, education, work experience, and 
having a business partner—that is to say, starting with a team (Schutjens & Wever, 2000; 
Storey, 1997). Firm-related elements are turnover level and the number of employees at start 
(Schutjens and Wever, 2000). Finally, strategy-related variables are: preparation for the 
start; a willingness to share ownership; the ability to identify a niche; the introduction of a 
new product; the ability to create a team of managers (Schutjens & Wever, 2000; Storey, 
1997).  
Other more conceptual studies have provided frameworks that identify the mechanisms that 
enable or inhibit organizational growth and change (Aldrich, 1999; Alvarez & Busenitz, 
2001; Garnsey, 1998). This change may be caused by growth, or may itself cause growth. 
Perhaps the most influential framework for the explanation of a firm’s growth is the resource-
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based or competence based view (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1995). In this framework, the 
entrepreneurs have to aspire to the growth of the firm, but growth is constrained by the 
availability and quality of resources. A firm is essentially regarded as a set of resources that 
are deployed in a firm-specific way that determines its competence. Managerial (team) 
resources are particularly critical in realizing a firm’s growth. However, it is not only the 
firm-internal resources and competences that are decisive for the growth of a firm. External 
resources and competences acquired via the networks of the entrepreneurs or inter-
organizational networks may also enhance growth (Johannisson, 2000). An entrepreneurial 
team can therefore be advantageous, since it provides more resources in general and external 
network relations than solo start-ups do (Brüderl et al., 1996; Thakur, 1999). However, an 
entrepreneurial team may also offer a qualitatively different advantage: a management team. 
Although the established empirical and conceptual literature on small firm growth 
acknowledges the role of entrepreneurial teams in the growth of firms, a stream of literature 
on the performance of team start-ups has only recently emerged (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Kamm et al. 1990; Lechler, 2001; Weinzimmer, 1997). Several team characteristics 
have been found to affect new venture performance and organizational growth (Weinzimmer, 
1997; Ensley & Amason, 1999). Growth in new firms will be positively related to the level of 
a team’s heterogeneity in industry and functional experience. This heterogeneity will provide 
a system of checks and balances in decision-making and complementary strengths that, taken 
together, provide more value than the sum of its parts. Another important characteristic is 
team size. This can be related both positively and negatively to new firm growth. A large size 
enables decision-makers to specialize and make decisions more quickly. As a result, the 
owners of new firms have to delegate responsibility. However, larger teams may also 
generate more discussion; that may slow down decision-making and may even lead to 
enduring (affective) conflicts (cf. Ensley et al., 2002). The relationship between team size and 
performance is also unclear in terms of its causality: on the one hand large start-ups require 
large teams to manage them successfully, while on the other hand large teams will be 
attracted to high-growth ventures that have the potential to support them (Birley & Stockley, 
2001).  
The fundamental question arising from this literature review is whether team start-ups are 
qualitatively different from solo start-ups, or whether they merely differ in quantitative 
respects. In other words, do entrepreneurial teams develop a team competence that is more 
than simply the sum of the individual resources of the team members, including experience, 
financial capital and social capital, or can their success be explained just by the accumulation 
of the resources they bring together? It is assumed here that team start-ups do indeed perform 
better than solo start-ups during the early life course—an axiom that is still unproven. Early 
success may not be enduring, since team-specific as well as general growth problems may 
arise that have to be solved during the life course. To investigate this question we need 
longitudinal research that identifies the changing characteristics and performance of (team) 
start-ups during their life course. 
 
 
Research sample and definitions 
 
Recent reflections on the fields of small business and entrepreneurship research have 
concluded that there is an explicit need for longitudinal research on firm growth (Chandler 
and Lyon, 2001; Davidsson and Wiklund, 2000). In this study of the performance of team 
start-ups in the first phases of the life course we have used an extensive database covering 
different aspects of the first years of team start-ups and solo start-ups. This database is the 
EIM (Economic Institute of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) “Starters Cohort” which 
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has followed a group of new firms that were registered in the Dutch Chambers of Commerce 
in the first quarter of 1994 (see EIM, 1996). This group of new firms was followed during the 
first six years of their life course (1994-2000). Every year, the entrepreneurs of these firms 
were asked to respond to a set of questions, which made it possible to gather information on 
their behaviour, their experiences, and the development of the firms in the first six years of 
their existence. Such a longitudinal research enables the recording of the development of new 
firms and their owners over a longer period. 
The sample was selected from a database of all the start-ups registered with the Chambers of 
Commerce. Start-ups registered only for administrative or technical reasons were excluded. 
The sample consisted of a broad range of sectors, including manufacturing, wholesale, retail, 
personal services, and business services. A sample was obtained of 1938 firms starting up in 
1994 and these were followed in the six years after their start. However, as this study only 
deals with new and independent firms, those that were not really new (restarts, or take-overs) 
or were not completely independent were not included in our research sample. This reduced 
the sample to 1544 new firms (in 1994), 504 of which could still be traced in 2000. It cannot 
be ruled out that there might have been more survivors because every year there were some 
firms that could not be contacted by telephone (see Dirks et al., 2002).  
All firms in the sample had fewer than 100 employees, which is representative for the total 
population of Dutch firms, since 99% of them have fewer than 100 employees (CBS, 2003). 
We distinguished team start-ups and solo start-ups on the basis of the variables available in 
our database. The operational definition of a team start-up is an enterprise that is formally 
started by two or more owners. A team must consist of at least two members who function as 
business partners and who each work at least 10 hours a week for the enterprise. The 
operational definition of a solo start-up is an enterprise that is formally started by one owner. 
Solo start-ups do not have business partners who work for more than 10 hours a week for the 
enterprise.  
Based on these definitions, 90 new firms set up in 1994 could be classified as team start-ups 
and 1196 new firms could be classified as solo start-ups. A group of 258 could not be 
classified as either a team start-up or as a solo start-up. We distinguished three phases in the 
life course: the period before the formal start (pre-start phase); the start phase (the first three 
years of existence); the continued survival phase following on the start phase (the period in 
which the firms are four to six years old). The start phase was operationalized as the first 
three years of operation, since this phase is acknowledged as the most critical for the survival 
of new firms: once firms have survived for three years they can be described as having passed 
through the “valley of death” (Gibb, 1990, in Littunen, 2000). After six years there were still 
32 team start-ups and 449 solo start-ups in the research sample (2000).  
The dependent variable, performance of start-ups, is perhaps one of the most often studied 
variable in small business research. However, this does not mean that consensus has been 
reached on the best measure of performance, or more specific, growth. In a quantitative sense 
two measures of growth dominate in academic research: sales growth and employment 
growth. Employment growth best represents the growth of the productive base of the firm, 
while sales growth is the best indicator of the commercial base of the firm (see Stam et al., 
2003). Perhaps the best, but also most difficult to measure, indicator of growth is growth in 
terms of assets (Garnsey, 1998; Davidson and Wiklund, 2000). In this study growth has been 
operationalized in four ways: termination of the firm in general, sale of the firm, attainment 
of a certain threshold size in employment (20 or 10 employees in the period after the start), 
and the new job creation in the cohort studied. We have chosen to focus on employment 
growth because of the societal relevance of this indicator (job creation) and on the probable 
organizational bottlenecks accompanied with personnel growth.  
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Results 
 
Characteristics of team start-ups versus solo start-ups 
 
Team start-ups can be distinguished from solo start-ups on the basis of their characteristics 
before and during the start phase. We found several important distinctive characteristics of a 
team start-up that differed from those of a solo start-up. In general, team start-ups have more 
resources and competences at their disposal. With regard to financial and human resources, 
they more often start with a large start-up capital and significantly more often with personnel 
and with significantly more personnel than solo start-ups. The entrepreneurs of team start-ups 
more frequently have a significantly higher educational level, previous start-up experience 
(habitual entrepreneurship; cf. Westhead & Wright, 1998), and managerial experience than 
the entrepreneurs of solo start-ups. The entrepreneurs of team start-ups also tend to be more 
ambitious than entrepreneurs of solo start-ups, because they more often strive for growth of 
turnover, large investments, and more often have a business plan. The team start-ups are also 
distinctive in their output: they have a higher turnover in the first year after start-up, and they 
export more often from the start. Summarizing, we found that team start-ups start with a 
larger size and with more ambition and commitment than solo start-ups. The characteristics 
of team and solo start-ups are shown in table 1.  
 
Performance of team start-ups 
 
The share of successful team start-ups is higher than that of solo start-ups on several 
indicators. First, during the first six years 18.0% of the solo start-ups versus only 13.5% of 
the team start-ups were registered as terminated. Second, since the sale of a young enterprise 
can also be seen as an indicator of success, team start-ups performed better than solo start-
ups: 4.5% and 2.0% respectively were sold. Third, a larger share of the team start-ups attain a 
large size than solo start-ups: 3.3% and 4.5% of the team start-ups reach a size of 20 or 10 
employees respectively during their life course in comparison with only 0.4% and 1.3% of 
the solo start-ups. And fourth, despite their small number (6% of the total 1994 cohort), team 
start-ups were responsible for 20% and 37% of the additional employment creation in the first 
year (1994) and the second year (1995) respectively of the “Starters Cohort”. These 
percentages would be even higher if the entrepreneurs of the start-ups were to be included 
with the firm’s ‘employees’. Team start-ups show an explosive growth during the first three 
years of existence, but they slow down in the subsequent phase. Despite this relative decline 
in the third year, team start-ups still generated 15% of the total employment creation in the 
1994-1997 period and 9% in the 1994-2000 period, a far greater share proportionally than 
their share in the number of firms. In the six-year period analysed, their relative contribution 
to total employment creation was higher in each year than that of the solo start-ups.  
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Table 1. Comparison of the characteristics of team and solo start-ups (in percentages) 
   Team start-ups Solo start-ups 
Pre-start phase    
Delayed start * 26.6 20.3 
     - because of finance problems ¹ 47.6 28.9 
     - because of regulations (problems with licenses) ¹ 19.0 10.9 
Business plan before start * 48.9 28.6 
     - Used network for business plan  * 58.3 41.7 
     - Assistance of accountant * 71.9 51.0 
    
Start phase (characteristics during start)    
Resources    
start-up capital (> € 11.312) * 52.2 24.2 
Turnover at start (> € 11.312 one year after first year of existence) * 86.1 63.3 
Personnel at start * 20.5 6.4 
Educational level    
    - higher education * 41.6 31.4 
Employed before start  55.6 65.9 
Work experience (more than 5 years employed)  67.5 75.4 
Industry experience^  61.4 63.7 
Age entrepreneur      
    - younger than 29 years  38.2 27.7 
    
Strategy    
Concrete investment plans at start, execution is certain * 23.9 15.6 
    - investment sum (> € 11.312) * 50.9 26.7 
Export * 20.0 7.8 
    
Competences    
Habitual entrepreneurship * 23.3 5.1 
Reasonable to very much financial management experience^ * 41.9 29.1 
Reasonable to very much executive experience^ * 58.4 51.0 
Entrepreneurial capacities^ * 73.8 58.1 
Prepared to take risks^ * 79.8 63.9 
    
Motivation    
Aim for growth in turnover * 73.3 50.9 
Dependent on profits from the enterprises as primary income  43.8 37.9 
Other sources of income * 73 78 
    
Other    
Sex (male)  80 72 
Confidence in future (optimism)  92.1 80.0 
Work load at start (> 40 hours) * 48.8 30.0 
^ own opinion respondent       *   significantly different (α < 0.05)  
 ¹    not significant 
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The relatively fast initial growth of team start-ups can possibly be explained by the greater 
amount of resources and competences at the start of team start-ups in comparison with solo 
start-ups. This statement is in line with our finding that the average profit and turnover 
expectations at start are higher for team start-ups than solo start-ups. However, the significant 
differences in the employment growth of team start-ups in comparison with solo start-ups that 
we found disappear when the start-up capital (> € 11,312) is controlled for. Only during the 
first three years (1994-1997) did team start-ups with a large start-up capital (> € 11,312) grow 
faster than comparable solo start-ups. The same finding holds true for the variables aiming 
for growth of turnover and managerial experience. It seems that these factors no longer affect 
the growth of team start-ups after the start period of the first three years. A possible 
explanation for this finding can be that these resources and competences of team start-ups are 
not sufficient or suitable for the continued growth of team start-ups and that other (team) 
competences increase in importance. Unfortunately, the database did not provide variables 
measuring changing competences after the start period. Finally, it is remarkable that factors 
such as habitual entrepreneurship, work experience, and the age of the entrepreneur have no 
significant effect on the performance of team start-ups in their first six years of existence, 
while they do significantly affect the performance of solo start-ups. It could be hypothesised 
that these success factors of solo start-ups are suppressed by team-related factors in team 
start-ups.  
Not only does the relative performance of team start-ups change during the life course; there 
is also a clear segmentation within the group of team start-ups. Depicting the whole group of 
team start-ups as an undivided success does not therefore do justice to the actual situation. 
Indeed, there are two distinctive groups of team start-ups: a relatively successful group that 
had an average growth of 2.8 employees in the period 1994-2000 and a group of team start-
ups that did not grow at all during the first six years of their existence. Both groups are about 
equal in terms of the number of firms they include. In contrast with the successful group, the 
less successful group of team start-ups did not write a business plan of any kind. They also 
declined to aim for employment growth. All the team start-ups whose start had been delayed 
(5%) also belonged to this less successful group. In fact, this ‘unsuccessful’ group of team 
start-ups was even less successful than the group of solo start-ups. For example, the solo 
start-ups without a business plan (70%) still grew by an average of 0.8 employees during the 
period 1994-2000. However, in the start phase (the first three years), both groups of team 
start-ups grew faster than the solo start-ups.  
 
Bottlenecks during the life course 
 
A possible explanation of the relatively early stagnation of growth for the team start-ups is 
the extent to which team start-ups experience managerial bottlenecks. The nature of these 
during the life course is shown in table 2.  
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Table 2. Most important managerial bottlenecks of team (and solo) start-ups 
* Share of team start-ups significantly larger than solo start-ups (α < 0.05) 
 
Team start-ups grew relatively quickly in the start phase, while solo start-ups often showed a 
slow steady growth. The slow but persistent growth of solo start-ups was accompanied by a 
decrease in the share of solo start-ups that experienced bottlenecks in the period after the 
start. In contrast, the percentage of team start-ups that experienced bottlenecks remained high 
(see table 3). On top of that, team start-ups not only experienced managerial bottlenecks 
significantly more often than the solo start-ups; team start-ups also experienced significantly 
more such bottlenecks.  
 
Table 3. Percentage of team and solo start-ups experiencing managerial bottlenecks during 
the life course 
Years 1994 1995* 1996 1997 1998* 1999* 2000*
Team start-ups 90.0 97.2 86.7 87.0 100.0 87.0 96.7
Solo start-ups 86.8 87.4 85.0 81.1 73.5 40.4 73.6
* Significantly different (α < 0.05) 
 
The relatively large share of team start-ups with personnel at the start provides a possible 
explanation for the fact that team start-ups experience more survival-threatening and growth-
related bottlenecks than solo start-ups do. The occurrence of managerial bottlenecks was 
statistically related to the presence of personnel. This outcome is in line with our finding that 
team start-ups without personnel did not experience significantly more bottlenecks than solo 
start-ups without personnel. In general, the percentage of firms experiencing bottlenecks 
remained higher among team start-ups than among solo start-ups throughout the whole period 
studied. There were some significant differences in the period after the start. More than 50% 
of the team start-ups experienced growth-related and survival-threatening problems in their 
sixth year of existence; these percentages were much lower for solo start-ups: 22% and 33% 
respectively experienced growth-related and survival-threatening bottlenecks in their sixth 
year of existence (see table 4).  
 
 Bottlenecks of team start-ups 
• Financial problems* Pre-start phase 
• Administrative burdens* 
• Timely payment by customers 
• Liquidity* 
• Attitude of bank financiers* 
Start phase 
(1995-1997) 
• Development of market areas
• Shortage of (qualified) personnel 
• (Re)organization* 
• Accommodation 
Continued 
survival phase 
(1998-2000) 
• Development of market areas 
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Table 4. Growth-related and survival-threatening bottlenecks during the life course 
 Share of enterprises with survival-
threatening bottlenecks 
Share of enterprises in 1999 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 with growth related 
bottlenecks 
stating “problems are 
hard to solve” 
Team start-up 33 % 30 % 41 % 52 % 52 %* 50 % 
Solo start-up 18 % 11 % 29 % 33 % 22 %* 42 % 
* significantly different (α < 0.05) 
 
The internal dynamics of team start-ups may provide explanations for their growth stagnation 
and the high percentage of team start-ups experiencing bottlenecks. Our longitudinal analysis 
showed that five years after start-up at least a third of the business partners no longer 
participated actively in the enterprise. Furthermore, at least 25% of the team start-ups 
reported illness or problems involving their business partner(s) as the cause of the survival-
threatening bottlenecks (critical incidents; cf. Curran & Blackburn, 1994). Moreover, team 
start-ups with only two team members in the start phase (1994-1998) grew significantly faster 
than team start-ups with more than two team members. Perhaps it takes a longer time period 
for large teams to develop efficient managerial processes, or to resolve conflicts.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This study has provided an exploratory analysis of the early life course of team start-ups in 
comparison with solo start-ups. As other studies on team start-ups have reported, we found 
relatively more successful team start-ups than solo start-ups on the basis of several 
performance indicators. However, a cross-sectional comparison of team start-ups and solo 
start-ups cannot reveal the dynamics that are particularly relevant for firms in the first critical 
years of their existence. Our longitudinal research study has shown that promising team start-
ups (with a large start-up capital, aiming for growth of turnover, and with managerial 
experience) are only more successful than similar promising solo start-ups in the first three 
years of their existence. In the phase following the initial three years, team start-ups seem to 
lose their initial shine. An explanatory factor for their fading success may be managerial 
bottlenecks. We found that, after the start phase, team start-ups encounter managerial 
problems significantly more and significantly more often than solo start-ups do. The 
occurrence of managerial bottlenecks is related not only to the presence of personnel, but also 
to illness or problems involving business partners. Not only do these bottlenecks hamper 
growth; they may even threaten the survival of an enterprise.  
Apart from significant differences between solo and team start-ups and the changing relative 
performance of team start-ups during the life course, we also found a clear segmentation 
dividing the growing and the stagnating team enterprises. Just as the heterogeneity of the 
group of start-ups in general has long been acknowledged, the group of team start-ups cannot 
be considered as a homogenous collection of enterprises either.  
 
One could wonder whether the results of an empirical study in one particular context (the 
Netherlands in 1994-2000) can be relevant for explaining the same phenomenon 
(performance of team start-ups) in other contexts. The mechanisms behind the differential 
performance of solo and team start-ups and within the group of team start-ups can probably 
be generalized in an analytical sense (cf. Yin, 2003). However, another context may have 
effect on the contingent conditions of the performance of these start-ups and may for example 
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explain the dominance of other types of bottlenecks for team start-ups. For example in a 
period of economic recession, ‘shortage of (qualified) personnel’ would probably be a less 
dominant bottleneck than in this study. Also in countries with a different financial system 
than the Netherlands (e.g. the USA), the ‘attitude of bank financiers’ might be a less obvious 
bottleneck. The specific context of this research makes that we have to be cautious about 
applying the statistical generalisation of these findings to other contexts. However, the 
results, especially the resource and competence mechanisms can be generalized in an 
analytical way.  
 
The added value of longitudinal research is that it revealed the dynamics of (in particular 
team) start-ups during their life course. In time these dynamics provide important elements 
for the explanation of the performance of team start-ups. In our view, the simple 
accumulation of resources does not explain the presumed enduring success of team start-ups. 
Growth and team-specific problems have to be overcome, and this process may eventually 
lead to the formation of new competences enabling further growth. In this respect we see 
interesting conceptual links with the competence or resource-based perspective. More in-
depth research taking a longitudinal perspective is needed if further insight into the team 
dynamics and the formation of new competences is to be acquired. In addition to the study of 
team dynamics, problem solving, and competence formation, more research is also needed to 
uncover the effect of teams on opportunity recognition and development (Ardichvilli, 2003). 
The combination of entrepreneurs with different knowledge and networks within teams and 
the formation and development of competences would provide two ways in which team start-
ups may not only recognize more opportunities than solo start-ups, but could also turn them 
towards success.  
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